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244 HARDY v. HARDY [23 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18463. In Bank. Dec. 3, 1943. ] 
MYRTLE LEE HARDY, Appellant, v. OLIVER 
VILLE HARDY, Respondent. 
NOR-
[1] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Affidavits_S .... Under CdC' P §, u.wclency.-
o e IV. roc. 437c, a motion for Summar 'ud ::~~ may not be gr~~ted except on affidavits in favo; o~ t:; 
. Ing p~rty. contaInIng facts sufficient to entitl h' t Judgment In hIS favor. e 1m 0 a 
[2] ~-summhary JUdgments-Affi.davits-Sufficiency._Where a 
e soug t recovery under a t 1 
elll the theory that th h b [roper y sett ement agreement 
unless hi e u~ an was to pay her $250 a week 
s aver~ge weekly Income was less than $1 000 but th 7!r~,~:ent p~~vIded for smaller payments in case of a decreas: 
thO 1 e wee y amount received," defendant's affidavit that 
. IS angu~ge accurately expressed the intention of the ~Ies contaIned facts sufficient to entitl h' t par-Judgment, - e 1m 0 a summary 
(3) rdi-;-~sumthmat~ JI udgments-Oounter Affidavits-Issue of Fact e rIa court's duty to d t' . judgment if th ffi 1 " e~'!( a mo IOn for summary 
triable issue ofe f:ctaav;: InffiOdPp~sItlOn thereto establishes a 
h . n a aVlt, however does n t . 
:uc an issue unless it sets forth facts showi~g that t:e r:::e 
t:St a good and substantial defense to plaintiff's actio~ y 
C. a pa gOOd§ cause of action exists on the merits (See Co~r IV. roc., 437c.) . e 
r~] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement A -
pretation: Judgments-Summary Jud t gre;ments-Inter_ 
-In a wife's action for breach of gmen s- ssue of Fact. 
ment declaring that the husband :h~:~~e~~ s:~!le:~nt $~~Oee­
week, but only a fourth of his income when it fell bel e a 
a week, whe:e the agreement did not indicate that t;W $1,~0 
amount receIved by him was to be comput d' t e wee, .y 
average inco h ffid' e In erms of hIS f me, . er a aVlt, filed in opposition to his m t' 
or a summary Judgment assertin th t h . 0 IOn industry in who h h' gat e mohon picture 
, IC e was employed regard d . 
weeks as work weeks was insuffi' t t', e. SuspensIon 
in the absence of a sho . Clen 0 r~Ise an ISSue of fact, 
gation in terms of his WIng that. the parhes regarded his obli-
average Income and a . 
ment was correctly entered. ' summary Judg-
[1] See 7 Oal.Jur. Ten-Year SuPp. 255. 
McR. Dig. References: [1-3] ,fud " ' 
Wife, § 157(6); Judgments, § 8a. gments, § 8a; [4J Husband and 
I 
! 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Charles S. Burnell, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for breach of a property settlement agreement. 
Summary judgment for defendant affirmed. 
Roger Marchetti and Bartlett & Kearney for Appellant. 
Benjamin W. Shipman for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 24, 1937, plaintifI Myrtle Hardy 
and defendant Oliver Hardy executed a property' settlement 
agreement providing that defendant would pay $250 weekly 
for the support of plaintifI unless his jncome fell"below $1,000 
a week, in which case he would pay one-quarter of the amount 
he received. PlaintifI contends that defendant was bound_ 
to pay $250 weekly, regardless of his actual receipts in ai, 
particular week, if his income averaged over! $1,000 a week.' 
Defendant contends that in any week in which his receipts' 
were less than $1,000, he was bound to pay' oruyone-quarter 
of the amount actually received, without regard to anyaver~' 
age. Defendant is a motion picture actor, and ,'his contract 
with his employer gave him a salary in excessdof $1,000 'a~ 
week for forty weeks in the year. For theother'twe'hre'weeks; 
described as "suspension weeks," defendant received $100 a' 
week. The employer was free to designate as slispenslon w'eekS l 
any twelve weeks in the year. Although defendant's annual{ 
income averaged more than $1,000 a week, he paid plaintiff' 
for the suspension weeks only one-quarter of the amount' 
he actually received at such times. On ,April 16, 1941,plain.i " 
tifI commenced this action for breach of contract,praymg i 
alternatively for reformation. Defendant:6.led an answer· 
denying the allegations of the complaint and moved for sum.-
mary judgment in his favor. It was stipulated that if defen-; 
-dant correctly interpreted the contract, no ' issue 'of fact 
existed requiring trial. On November 4, 1941, the motion was 
granted and judgment was entered on March 26, 1942. 
[1] A motion for summary judgment may not be granted 
ex<wpt on affidavits in favor of the moving party containing 
facts sufficient to entitle him to judgment in his favor. (Code 
Civ. Proc., sec. 437c.) [2] Defendant sets forth the pertment 
portion of the contract in his affidavit. It provides that" .•. 
for the support of :6.rst party (plai.r).tifI), second party (de-
246 HARDY V. HARDY [23 C.2d 
fendant) shall pay to first party from this day forward ... 
the sum of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) per week 
BUT IN THE EVENT the weekly amount received by second 
party from any source whatever, either as income, salary, 
royalty, commission, bonuses, and/or earnings falls below 
one thousand dollars ($1000.00) per week, the amount which 
second party is required to pay to first party during the 
week or weeks when such income, etc. falls below $1000.00, 
is to be reduced to one-fourth of the amount so actually re-
ceived by second party from the said source." 
This provision explicitly imposes an obligation determined 
by the amount actually paid to defendant each week. It re-
fers to a decrease in "the weekly amount received" as the 
basis for reducing defendant's obligation, and specifies that 
reduced payments shall be "one fourth of the amount actu-
ally received." Moreover, the contract provides that pay-
ments be reduced in the "week" or "weeks" in which de-
fendant's income falls below $1,000. It could not thus take 
account of the possibility of a reduction in defendant's in-
come in a single week if it envisaged payments in terms of 
defendant's average receipts over a longer period. 
Since the language of the contract, standing alone, imposes 
an obligation based on defendant's actual weekly receipts, 
defendant's affidavit that this lan:luage accurately expresses 
the intention of the parties contains facts ~ufficient to entitle 
him to judgment. These facts are set forth with sufficient par-
ticularity (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 437c), for defendant stated 
not only that the writing was consistent with the understand_ 
ing of the parties, but that the understanding was "that when 
. I received, for any week, the Sum of $1000 or more, I paid 
the plaintiff $250 for such week from such receipts; when I 
received less than $1000 I paid her 25% of the sum received. 
... " Moreover, defendant set forth another part of the con-
tract which stated that the parties had examined and dis-
cussed all of the provisions of the contract with the aid of 
counsel and fully understood their rights and liabilities under 
it. In compliance with the code, these facts were set forth 
as of defendant's knowledge and are matters to which he 
could testify. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 437c.) 
[3] It would nevertheless be the trial court's duty to 
deny the motion for summary judgment if the affidavit in 
opposition thereto established a triable issue of fact. (Walsh 
v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439 [116 P.2d 62].) .An affidavit, how-
Dec. 1943] HARDY v. HARDY 
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- . l't ts f rth "factS ever, does not raise such an Issue un ess 1 se .. 0. .'. '.' 
showing that the party has a good and' substa~tIal ~efeus~ to 
the laintifI's action, ... or that a good cause of ac:l0~ exIsts 
on t1e merits." (Code Civ. Proc., sec~ 437~ . .> Plallltlfff c~n­
tends that her affidavit, as well.as a ?eposltlon taken 0 e~ 
testimony, .contains evidence of the ~lrc~msta~ces, s~:.round 
ing the execution of the contract that Illdlcate:s Itwas<~tended., 
that defendant's obligation was to be determIlled by hIS. aver-
age income. . . t ao [4] PlaintifI's affidavit sets forth that motlonplc ure . -
tors are paid high salaries in work weeks and low salarIes 
in suspension weeks, that in the motion picture industry ISuc~ 
salaries are usually described in terms of the work wee~ eve, 
and that the work week salary is regarded as "partly ~nclud­
in the suspension week period." Thus, it would be sa~d that 
a ~erson who received $1,500 in work weeks and $100 Ill. s.us-
pension weeks had a salary of, $1,500 a week. In des~rl~lll~ 
the negotiations between plaintiff and defendant, plaIlltI~ s 
affidavit states that it was the understanding of the p~rt~es 
that defendant was to pay plaintiff $250 a week unless hIS Ill-
come fell below $1,000 a week, and that no refer~nce v:as 
made to suspension weeks. This evidence do~ not aId ~laIll­
tifI. The absence of any reference to suspenSIon weeks III no 
way suggests that they were to be re~ar~ed as :work weeks. 
Whatever the customary view of salarIes III the Ill?ustry, an 
actor would hardly regard his receipts as $1,500 III a week 
when he was only paid $100. There is no indication that the 
parties understood that in suspension weeks "the weekly 
amount received by second party from any source whatever, 
either as income, salary, royalty, commission, bonuses, and/~r 
earnings" meant the salary received in work weeks. ~or ~~ 
there anything to suggest that the "weekly amo~nt recewe~ 
by defendant was to be computed in terms. of ~1S ave.rage Ill-
come over a given period. In fact no perlOd IS speCIfied for 
the computation of such an average: Only at the end Of. such 
a period could an average be computed, yet defendant IS re-
quired to make payments each wee~. In the absence of ~y 
agreement as to the basis for computlllg the amount to be paId 
each week there would be no way of determini~g the extent of 
defendant's obligation if it were regarded Ill. terms of an 
average income, and the contract would be VOId for uncer-
tainty. (Talmadge v. Ar·r'uwhead R. Co., 101 Cal. 367 [35 P. 
248 RISKIN v. IND. Ace. COM. [23 C.2d 
100?]; Wineburgh v. Gay, 27 Cal.App. 603 [150 P 1003]. Sa~~n~ v. Pedrotti, 103 Cal.App. 203 [284 P. 472])' S· ' 
plaIntIff's affid 't h f . Ince 
. . aVI t ere ore does not contain facts establish-
Ing .that she had a cause of action, it is not sufficient to raise 
:;e~sue(~f f~t, ;ndf summ~ry judgment was correctly en-
. ee an 0 Amerwa v. Oil Well Supply 00 12 
Cal.App.2d 265 [55 P.2d 885] ; Security-First National Bank 
of L. A: v. Cryer,. 39 Cal.App.2d 757 [104 P.2d 66].) 
The Judgment IS affirmed. 
GdiSbsohn, C. J., Shenk,J., Ourtis, J., Edmonds J. Oarter J 
an c auer, J., concurred. '" ., 
[L. A. No. 18723. In Bank. Dec. 7, 1943.J 
R.D~N~ISKIN et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL AOOI-
OOMMISSION and A F MINER R d 
[1] 
" • espon ents. 
~ndepcndent Contractors-Definition: SuperviSion of Work b 
d;:e:e:~i!a~!O~he ~:~:~e~~nden~ contractor is one who ren: 
occupation, following his empr~;~~e~::!::t oe~pl?y~~nt or 
suIt o~ the work, and not the means whereb ~Y'sIn e re-
comphshed, whereas the relationship of er! 1 I to bde ae-
ployee exists h th p oyer an em-
trol or direct ~o;n:;:~vor~ :~io~:rd~~t:i:ss ;:~ rig~~ to conl -to be accomplished. as e resu t 
[2] ld.-Determination of Right of Control 0 
certaining wheth .- ne means of as-
control ho er or not the employer retains the right to 
whether i; i~h~ WOt~k shall be ~one, is the determination of 
obeyed. ' s ruc lOns were gIven, they would have to be 
Plo~~r ~~~u~~ance~ under which existence of relationship of em-
ll68 S . In epen ent contractor is predicable note 19 A L R 
. ee,. also, 13 CaI.Jur. 1014, 1024; 27 Am.J~r. 48i, 486 . . • 
McK. DIg. References: [lJ Independent Contractors §§ 1 .. 
5J Independent Contractors § 14' [3J I d d ' ,6, [2, § 5' [4J I d " n epen ent Contractors 
, . n ependent Contractors §§ 7 10' [6J W k 'C ' pensatlOn § 271(4)' [7J '" or men s om-
W km ~ C ' . Workmen's Compensation § 271 (5)' [8J or en s ompensatlOn § 170' [9] W km " . , § 272(2). "or en s Compensation, 
Dec. 1943] RISKIN v. IND. Ace. COM. 
123 C.2"d 248] 
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[3a, 3b] Id.-Right to Discharge Workmen as Factor.-A strong 
factor tending to show the relationship of an employee is the 
employer's right to terminate the work at his pleasure. The 
right immediately to discharge a workman involves the right 
of control. 
[4] Id.-Manner of Payment: Freedom of Action.-In determin-
ing whether the relationship is that of independent contractor 
or that of master and servant, neither the manner of payment 
nOT the choosing by the employee of his own hours of work is 
conclusive of the relationship. 
[5] Id.-Determination of Right of Control.-Where there is 
shown no express agreement as to the right of the claimed 
employer to control the mode and manner of doing the work, 
the existence or nonexistence of the right must be determined 
by reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances shown, 
and is a question of mixed law and fact. 
[6] Workmen's Compensation-Certiorari-Review of Findings-
Substantial Evidence.-Where there is substantial evidence to 
support the findings and order of the Industrial Accident 
Commission, the reviewing court may not substitute its views 
for those of the commission and annul the award. 
[7] Id. - Certiorari - Review of Findings - Inferences.- If the 
findings of the Industrial Accident Commission are supported 
by inferences which may fairly be drawn from the evidence, 
even though the evidence is susceptible. of opposing inferences, 
the reviewing court will not disturb the award.· 
[Sa, Sb] Id. - Proceedings - Evidence-SufficiencY~Relation of 
Employer and Employee.-The evidence supported' aftnding 
of the Industrial Accident Commission 'that a pEirson injured 
while working on a mining claim was an employee of the mine 
owners, rather than an independent contractor or the employee 
of a fellow workman, where, from. the fact that the mine 
owners could have terminated the work at their pleasure, it 
could be inferred that they had both .the :t:ight to give special 
instructions to the two workmen and the power to require 
obedience' thereto, and where said workmen were partners 
for this particular work, within the meaning of Lab. Code, 
§ 3360. (Disapproving of contrary holding on' similar' factual 
situations in Donlon Brus. v. IndustrialAcc.Oom., 173 Cal. 250, 
159 P. 715; Fidelity cf1 Deposit 00. v~ Brush, 176 Cal. 448, 168 P. 
890; and Parsons v. Industrial Ace. ;Oom., 178 Cal. 394, 173 P. 
585.) . 
[9] Id.-Certiorari-Review of Findings-Relationship of Em-
ployer and Employee.-Generally speakhig, it is a question of 
fact to be determined by the Industrial Accident Commission 
